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Introduction: From Epistemic to Ontic Structural Realism 2
Structuralism has a long and honourable history in the philosophy of science, but interest
in the programme has recently been re-awakened in the context of the realism-antirealism
debate. Worrall, in particular, has presented an epistemological form of structuralism as a
response to Laudan's 'Pessimistic Meta-Induction' (Worrall 1996). Put rather crudely and
simply, the idea is that although the history of science is, to a significant extent, a history
of changing ontologies - as one moves from the particle theory of light to the wave theory
to Maxwell's theory and so on, for example - the same history suggests that important
structural elements of theories are preserved through both 'n rmal' changes and, most
importantly, revolutions. By 'ontology' here is meant he theoretical representation f
scientific entities, such as light, electrons etc.; the relevant structures, on the other hand, are
represented for Worrall by the appropriate mathematical equations - Snell's Laws are
incorporated into Maxwell's Equations and so on. Thus whereas the ontological
component of a theory may be subjected to a pessimistic meta-induction, as far as the
structural component is concerned things look quite optimistic. This gives rise to a form of
'Structural Realism' (SR) which holds that one can, and should, adopt a realist attitude
towards the well confirmed structural aspects of theories (see also Redhead 1995). As
Ladyman has pointed out (1998), this should be regarded as an epistemic form of SR
since it holds that all that we know are the structures, while the objects themselves remain
epistemologically inaccessible. It is worth noting that in defending this position Worral
draws on the history of structuralism in the form of those famous passages from Science
and Hypothesis where Poincaré writes that theoretical terms '... are merely names of the
images we substituted for the real objects which Nature will hide forever from our eyes.
The true relations between these real objects are the only reality we can ever obtain.'(1905,
p. 162).  However, as Domski has emphasised, Poincaré may not be the most appropriate
name to drop in order to give historical legitimacy to this version of SR, given his Kantian
inclinations and rejection of truth as the aim of science (Domski preprint). Such
inclinations appear again and again through the history of structuralism and the issue
arises as to whether the structural realist can neatly peel them off from the rest of
structuralist programme.
Leaving aside such historical issues for the moment, there are two philosophical
concerns that arise in this context:
1. the idea of epistemologically inaccessible objects, hidden behind the structures as it
were, may be thought to run counter to the scientific 'attitude' in general, or to hearken back
to some form of pre-Scientific Revolution scholasticism (Psillos 1999).
2. the nature of these objects remains as problematic for the epistemic structural realist as
it is for the 'standard' realist insofar as there exists a kind of metaphysical
underdetermination whereby quantum mechanics upports both a metaphysics of
individuals and a metaphysics of 'non-individuals' (French 1998; van Fraassen 1991).
Ladyman's 'ontic' form of SR (Ladyman 1998) can be seen as responding to both
of these concerns by effectively eliminating the objects completely, leaving only the
structures. Again, put simply, the idea is that it is not just that all that we know are the
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2structures but that all that there is ar  the structures. The elaboration and development of
this position has raised a number of interesting issues, to do with the metaphysics of
structure, the conceivability of structures without any underlying objects, the identity
conditions for such structures and so on, some of which, at least, have been addressed
elsewhere (Ladyman 1998; French 1999; French and Ladyman forthco ing). As with
many developments in philosophy, one might feel a sense of deja vu as these or related
issues can be discerned running like threads through the history of structuralism.
In this paper I want to focus on the general issue of the impact on structuralism of
the quantum treatment of objects in terms of symmetry groups and, in particular, on the
question as to how we might eliminate, or better, reconceptualise such objects in structural
terms. With regard to the former, both Cassirer and Eddington not only explicitly and
famously tied their structuralism to the development of group theory but also drew on the
quantum treatment in order to further their structuralist aims and I want to ketchthe
relevant history here with an eye on what lessons might be drawn. With regard to the latter,
Ladyman has explicitly cited Castellani's work on the group-t oretical onstitution of
quantum objects and I want to indicate both how such an approach needs to be understood
if it is to mesh with ontic SR and how it might accommodate p rmutation symmetry
through a consideration of Huggett's recent work.
Lets begin with a little of the history of structuralism.
Cassirer and Eddington on Structures, Symmetry and Subjectivity
In a recent contribution to the on-going revival of interest in Cassirer's work, Ihmig
identifies the central theme running through Cassirer's writings in the philosophy of
science as the analysis of the concept of object (Ihmig 1999). The fundamental perspective
from which this analysis should proceed is epistemological:
'... epistemological reflection leads us everywhere to the insight that what the various sciences call the
"object" is nothing in itself, fixed once for all, but that it is first determined by some standpoint of
knowledge.' (Cassirer 1953, p. 356)
As is well known, Cassirer's interest in this issue can be traced back to his reflections on
then nature of space and the influence of Klein's Erlanger programme. And the crucial
insight offered by the latter concerned the introduction of the concept of group. What this
yields, of course, is a structural conception of geometrical objects which shifts the focus
from individual geometrical figures, grasped intuitively, to the relevant geometrical
transformations and the associated laws. This shift is then manifested in Cassirer's neo-
Kantian assertion of 'the priority of the concept of law over the concept of object.'
This assertion in turn forms an integral component of Cassirer's interpretation of
the Kantian understanding of objectivity:
'For objectivity itself - following the critical analysis and interpretation of this concept - is only another
label for the validity of certain connective relations that have to be ascertained separately and examined in
terms of their structure. The tasks of the criticism of knowledge ("Erkenntniskritik") is to work backwards
from the unity of the general object concept to the manifold of the necessary and sufficient conditions that
constitute it. In this sense, that which knowledge calls its "object" breaks down into a web of relations
that are held together in themselves through the highest rules and principles.' (Cassirer 1913, trans. in
Ihmig op. cit., p. 522)
These 'highest rules and principles' are the symmetry principles which represent that which
is invariant in the web of relations itself. And these principles, in turn, are represented
group-theoretically; thus the relevant group effectively lays down the general conditions in
terms of which something can be viewed as an object.
Cassirer's 'application' of this framework to the foundations of relativity theory is
well known (Ihmig op. cit., pp. 524-528). According to Ihmig, what it does is restore the
unity of the concept of object which is apparently undermined by the relativistic
transformations. From the structuralist perspective, this unity is 'reinstated on a higher
level.' (ibid., p. 525) via the 'lawful unity' of inertial systems offered by the Lorentz
transformations. The process of abstraction from a substantivalist conception of objects to
a structuralist one is furthered by the General Theory of Relativity and what we are left
3with is an understanding of the objects of a theory as defined by those transformations
which leave the relevant physical magnitudes invariant. Thus Cassirer saw General
Relativity as the natural conclusion of the structuralist tendency.
Cassirer's understanding of the foundations of GR has been further pursued by
Ryckman (1999), who points to the central importance of the principle of general
covariance in this understanding. According to Ryckman, Cassirer viewed general
covariance as a principle of objectivity which offers a 'deanthropomorphized' conception of
a physical object. Furthermore, he (Ryckman) claims, this view of Cassirer's meshed with
Einstein's own and underpinned the latter's objections to quantum mechanics through its
implementation in the separability principle.
As the requirement that the laws of nature be formulated so that they remain valid
in any frame of reference, general covariance '... is a further manifestation of the guiding
methodological principle of "synthetic unity" necessary to the concept of the object of
physical knowledge.' (ibid., p. 604). Regarded as a synthetic requirement, general
covariance comes to be seen as both a formal restriction and a heuristic guide for the
discovery of general laws of nature (ibid.). Physical objectivity - apparently lost by space
and time themselves - re-emerges in deanthropomorphised form in terms of the functional
forms of connection and coexistence:
'With the demand that laws of nature be generally covariant, physics has completed the transposition of
the substantial into the functional - it is no longer the existence of particular entities, definite
permanencies propagating in space and time, that form "the ultimate stratum of objectivity" but rather
"the invariance of relations between magnitudes".' (ibid., p. 606, citing Cassirer 1957, p. 467).
There has been comparatively little discussion of Cassirer's analysis of the other
major revolution of the twentieth century, namely quantum mechanics3. Ih ig state  in a
footnote that Cassirer assessed the results of this revolution in the same way as the above
with regard to the objects of science (op. cit., p. 515 fn. 1). However, there is the additional
element of the loss of individuality of the particles themselves which was apparently
implied by the new quantum physics4.
The overall framework is the same, encompassing as it does a shift from things-as-
substances to relations as the ground of objectivity in science; or as Cassirer put it, '[w]e
are concerned not so much with the existence of things as with the objective validity of
relations; and all our knowledge of atoms can be led back to, and depends on, this
validity'(Cassirer 1936, p. 143). In classical mech nics objectivity rests on the spatio-
temporal persistence of individual objects and here, '"[o]bjective" denotes a being which
can be recognized as the same in spite of all changes in its individual determinations, and
this recognition is possible only if we posit a spatial substratum.' (ibid., p. 177). As
Cassirer points out, 'The entire axiomatic system of classical mechanics is based on this
presupposition.' (ibid.). As is well known, this presupposition features explicitly in
Boltzmann's axioms for example and it forms the basis of the 'world-view' of classical
(particle) physics in which we have individual objects possessing at all times well-defined
properties and traversing well-defined spatio-temporal trajectories. It is this world-view
that is apparently overturned by quantum mechanics (at least under the orthodox
interpretation) and in the new situation in which we find ourselves, we cannot say that the
particles unambiguously possess definite properties at all times, even beyond measurement
interactions, or that they travel along well-defined trajectories. It is at this juncture that
Cassirer asks a pair of crucial questions: '... what are these electrons whose path we can
no longer follow? Is there any sense in ascribing to them a definite, strictly determined
existence, which, however, is only incompletely accessible to us?' (ibid., p. 178). In
answering these questions, Cassirer makes the fundamental demand of the ontic form of
structural realism, namely that we take the 'conditions of accessibility' as 'conditions of the
objects of experience'. If we do that, then '... there will no longer exist an empirical object
that in principle can be designated as utterly inaccessible; and there may be classes of
presumed objects which we will have to exclude from the domain of empirical existence
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4because it is shown that with the empirical and theoretical means of knowledge at our
disposal, they are not accessible or determinable' (ibid., p. 179). There are no epistemically
inaccessible objects laying behind the structures which we can know.
What is an electron then? Not, Cassirer insists, an individual object (ibid., p. 180)
and he cites Born's comment (from 1926) that from the perspective of quantum statistics,
the particles cannot be identified as individuals at all (ibid., p. 184). Cassirer writes,
'The impossibility of delimiting different electrons from one another, and of ascribing to each of them an
independent individuality, has been brought into clear light through the evolution of the modern quantum
theory, and particularly through the considerations connected with the Pauli exclusion principle.' (ibid., p.
184 fn. 17)5
Of course, this is to follow the 'received view' regarding the indistinguishability of
quantum particles which draws the conclusion that they are non-individuals in some sense.
Nevertheless, Cassirer takes it to further support the shift away from particles as
substantival 'things'. If we want to continue to talk, in everyday language, about electrons
as objects - because we lack the logico-linguistic resources to do otherwise - then we can
do so 'only indirectly', '... not insofar as they themselves, as individuals, are given, but so
far as they are describable as "points of intersection" of certain relations' (ibid.). And thi
relational conception of an object is taken straight from Kant himself: 'All we know in
matter is merely relations ... but among these relations ome are self-subsistent and
permanent, and through these we are given a determinate object.' (Kant, quoted on p. 182)
Charge, understood as an intrinsic or state-independent property of particles, is just such a
'self-subsistent and permanent relation' but as Cassirer points out, in an acute rebuttal of
the assumption made by the 'standard' realist, ' ... the constancy of a certain relation is not
at all sufficient for the inference of a constant carrier' (ibid.). The permanence of charge
justifies our regarding the electron, say, as a 'determinate object', where the scare quotes
indicate that the sense is that of an entity prior to reconceptualisation in structural terms,
but it is does not justify what Cassirer calls the 'substantialization and hypostasis' of the
electron in the sense of an entity which is not so reconceptualised.
Charge, like the other intrinsic properties, features in the relevant laws of physics
and according to Cassirer, what we have here is a reversal of the classical relationship
between the concepts of object and law (ibi ., pp. 131-132): instead of beginning with a
'definitely determined entity' which possess certain properties and which then enters into
definite relations with other entities, where these relations are expressed as laws of nature,
what we now begin with are the laws which express the relations in terms of which the
'entities' are constituted. From the structuralist perspective, the entity '... constitutes no
longer the self-evident starting point but the final goal and end of the considerations: the
terminus a quo has become a terminus ad quem.' (ibid., p. 131) Objectivity, therefore, is
determinable through law, which is prior to it (ibid., p. 176) and the boundaries of law
mark the boundaries of objective knowledge (ibid., p. 132).
As already indicated, Cassirer saw these developments in physics as confirming a
neo-Kantian epistemology (Werkmeister 1949 p. 777) according to which the laws of
physics - in particular those of quantum mechanics and relativity theory - provide the sole
basis for our integration of experience. In this integration, a crucial role is played by the
'principle' of causality, regarded not as a proposition pertaining to events themselves, but,
rather, '... a stipulation concerning the means through which things and events are
constituted in experience.' (ibid., p. 789). As such, the principle is not undermined by
quantum mechanics; indeed, Cassirer insists, understood as a demand for strict functional
dependence, the essence of causality remains untouched (op. cit., p. 188). The significance
of quantum physics for epistemology lies precisely with the above consideration regarding
the nature of objects.
The retention of causality provides of course a further connection between Cassirer
and Einstein. As I mentioned above, Ryckman also argues that general covariance
underpins Einstein's criterion of observer independent objectivity in terms of his principle
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5of separability (Ryckman op. cit.). The connection is provided by Schlick who claimed
that only general covariance can adequately satisfy the Maxwellian requirement that causal
differences between two events should not depend upon the particular spatio-temporal
locations of the events (Ryckman ibid., p. 609). This further requires a way of
distinguishing causal occurrences so that they may be regarded as similar but not identical
and this is what the principle of separability allows. As is now well known, the latter is
central to the EPR objection and by '... distinguishing physical systems by virtue of causal
independence of measurement interactions, [it] serves as a principle of individuation in lieu
of the usual identification of physical systems by reference to a fixed background of space
and time ...' (ibid., p. 615). The lesson drawn by Ryckman is that Einstein's criterion of
'observer objectivity' is not the expression of a 'simple minded realism', '... but rather a
presupposition for the application of causal laws in the physical description of the world.'
(ibid., p. 616).
Howard understood separability both in spatio-temporal terms and as a sufficient
condition for the individuality of physical systems. The failure of separability in quantum
mechanics was then taken to imply a kind of non-individuality for quantum systems.
Elsewhere, (French 1989), I've tried to resist this move, arguing that this presupposes that
spatio-temporal location is the 'Principle of Individuality' and that on an alternative
understanding of the latter, one could accommodate the failure of separability through the
introduction of Teller's 'non-supervenient' relations holding between the particles6.
Ryckman, however, takes Howard to have missed the point, since '... it is not possible to
use the bare points of the manifold ... as a means of individuating separate physical
systems' (ibid., p. 617, fn. 51), because - and this is the 'central message' of general
covariance - the bare manifold is not space-time. Thus the principle of separability is not to
be understood as a form of spatio-temporal principle of individuality.
How is it to be understood then? And if, as Ryckman suggests, it does function as
some kind of principle of individuation, how does this mesh with Cassirer's apparent
realisation that quantum particles should not be regarded as individuals? What I would like
to suggest (and this needs further elaboration, I know) is that it acts as a principle of
'pseudo-individuality' which allows us to distinguish systems - in a limited and localised
way - in terms of their independent causal effects but does not give us licence to effectively
import this principle beyond the observable effects and regard the systems as full-blown
individual objects7. Citing Heisenberg, Cassirer writes, 'The process of observation cannot
be simply objectified; its results cannot be turned immediately into real objects.' (1937, p.
142). The apparent failure of separability in EPR situations should then be read, not as a
failure of the principle as a 'Principle of Ps udo-Individuality' but as a failure of the
attempt to regard it as a Principle of (Full-Blown) Individuality and import it beyond the
immediate measurement situation. In line with Ladyman's ontic structural realism, how this
failure in turn should be understood is not in terms of the systems being non-individual
objects, but in terms of their not being objects at all. Thus structuralism ay offer a
different ontological perspective on the implications of the Bell/EPR results.
Finally, it is interesting that both Ihmig and Ryckman mention Eddington in the
context of Cassirer's structuralism (Ihmig op. cit., p. 528; Ryckman op. it., p. 606); Ihmig
in particular notes Eddington's emphasis on the importance of group theory in fleshing out
the structural approach to knowledge. I'd like to turn to Eddington's form of structuralism
now, as here the implications of quantum mechanics for the view of physical objects as
individuals played an even more important role in its development.
In the preface to his later philosophical work, The Philosophy of Physical Science
(Eddington 1939), Eddington remarks that in giving a name to his philosophy he hesitates
between 'Selective Subjectivism' and 'Structuralism' (ibid., p. viii)8. Both can be traced back
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6to his early reflections on the significance of relativity theory as presented in his Mind
papers of 19209. In the first (Eddington 1920a), Eddington rejects the standard approach
of beginning with intervals as measured by clocks and rods and then obtaining the field
equations, since the introduction of such clocks and rods before one has introduced the
matter out of which they are supposedly composed would be 'inconvenient' when one is in
the business of constructing the world in a 'strict analytical development' (ibid., p. 152).
We shall encounter this attitude again when we come to his view of particle
indistinguishability. Instead, Eddington begins with point events, the aggregate of which
constitute 'the World' (ibid., p. 147) and which is postulated to be four-dimensional.
Between any two neighbouring point events one can then define the interval, as a
quantitative relation, and comparison of intervals leads to a 'rule of connexion' (ibid., p.
148) which expresses a 'quality of the World' as measured by the usual coefficients gmn.
By an 'exceedingly complicated combination' of operations on the gmn one obtains the Gmn
(ibid., pp. 149-150) and voilá, Eddington introduces the field equations for the case of
empty space and for when matter is present10. These equations, he insists, should be read
from left to right, not as law  of the World relating the continuum of points events and
matter, since that leads to a kind of dualism (between the continuum of point events and
matter) but as mathematical identifications denoting 'definite and absolute' conditions of
the world (ibid., p. 151) which give us the perceptions of emptiness and of matter
respectively (Kilmister 1994, pp. 44-46)11. The field equation with non-vanishing stress-
energy tensor describes how the theoretical quality represented by the left-hand side is
'appreciated' by the mind. Hence, 'Matter does not cause an unevenness in the gravitational
field; the unevenness is matter.' (ibid., p. 152)12.
There are two important aspects to this, which relate to the structuralist and
subjectivist components of Eddington's thought respectively. By matter as theputative
cause of irregularities in the field, Eddington means matt r a  substance and thus this
construction is seen as eliminating substance from our ontology in favour of relational
structures. Secondly, 'matter', in this new sense, becomes dependent on the mind, since
'Matter is but one of a thousand relations between the constituents of the World, and it will
be our task to show why one particular relation has a special value for the mind.' (ibid., p.
153). In his later paper in the same volume (Eddington 1920b; contributed to the 1920
International Congress of Philosophy), Eddington draws an analogy with the construction
of constellations out of the distribution of the stars:
'In a sense these patterns exist in the sky; but their recognition is subjective. So out of the primitive
events which make up the external world, an infinite variety of "patterns" can be formed. There is one
type of pattern which for some reason the mind loves to trace wherever it can; where it can trace it, the
mind says, "Here is substance"; where it cannot, it says "How uninteresting! There is nothing in my line
here". The mind is dealing with a real objective substratum; but the distinction of substance and
emptiness is the mind's own contribution, depending on the kind of pattern it is interested in recognising.'
(ibid., p. 420).
Here we see how the structuralism and the selective subjectivism mesh.
Not all laws are subjective, however. What we have learned from relativity theory,
according to Eddington, is that there is a certain quality which distinguishes substantial
matter from mere emptiness. We have not yet discovered why the quality formerly known
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7as matter comes in lumps; hence the 'law of atomicity' may be a law of the World itself.
Accommodating the latter requires another alysiswhich must start from a different
basis:
'... starting from the postulate that the mind can appreciate only relations, the theory we have described is,
or is intended to be, the most general possible theory of the way in which relations can combine to form
permanent substance; and accordingly the laws of physics which result depend solely on this postulate as
to the mind. Whatever the constitution of he external world, we can pick out a four-dimensional
aggregate of entities which we may take to be our point -events since these have been left undefined. But
if we attempt to push the analysis behind the point-events, we are, I think, bound to particularise the
structure.' (1920a, p. 157).
It is this 'particularising' of the structure that is described by quantum mechanics, of
course, and here Eddington is quite explicit that in order to understand how it is that the
same quality which is chosen by the mind as substantial matter is singled out by Nature
for the property of atomicity, we must understand how relativity theory and quantum
physics can be related. This, of course, is the aim of the programme pursued in his later
work.
It is important to note that Eddington's structuralism is limited both globally and
locally. It is limited globally in that structuralism is appropriate only for metrical (or as he
later calls it 'symbolic') knowledge (see Eddington 1928, p. 321), such as we obtain
through physics, and not non-metrical (or 'intimate') knowledge (ibid., p. 322), which
would include biology as well as theology13. This is not the place to discuss Eddington's
religious beliefs but it is interesting to note that Dingle, in his critique (Dingle 1954),
characterises the difference between the metrical and non-metrical in terms of that between
structure and nature; thus non-metrical knowledge is knowledge of the nature of things. If
Dingle is correct, the Eddington would count as an epistemic structuralist (of a rather
peculiar, religious stripe, perhaps).I shall return to this point shortly.
His structuralism is also limited locally in the way already indicated, namely with
regard to the lack of a good theory of matter itself. As he wrote, 'The possibility of the
existence of an electron in space is a remarkable phenomenon which we do not yet
understand. The details of its structure must be determined by some unknown set of
equations ...' (1928, p. 153). In this regard, substance makes a reappearance:
'The fundamental basis of all things must presumably have structure and substance. We cannot describe
substance; we can only give a name to it. Any attempt to do more than give a name leads at once to an
attribution of structure. But structure can be described to some extent; and when reduced to ultimate terms
it appears to resolve itself into a complex of relations.' (ibid., p. 224)
As Kilmister notes, Eddington concludes, again, that atomicity may be a reflection of non-
subjective laws of the World and hence represents non-structural substance.
By the time of his 1927 Gifford lectures, published the following year as The
Nature of the Physical World (Ed ington 1928), Eddington was able to say rather more
about quantum physics than his earlier rather brief and simplistic remarks concerning the
quantum of action14. Nevertheless, he was not able to say enough to be able to incorporate
atomicity within his 'world building' (ibid., Ch. XI). This is presented even more clearly
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(ibid., pp. 230-231).
It is here that we see elements of Eddington's 'numerological' tendencies, as he expressed
the hope that from a 'structural interlocking' of relations, one might derive the desired
physical properties of the world.
In particular, by applying symmetry constraints to the structure, Eddington claimed
that we could construct geometry and mechanics, on the one hand, and electromagnetism
on the other15. Again, the relevant laws are described as 'mathematical identities', whose
violation is 'unthinkable'16. And again, the construction obtained is too coarse to
accommodate the microscopic structure of the world. Here Eddington acknowledges that
he 'scarcely knows' what to think. Perhaps the laws of quantum physics will also come to
be seen as mathematical identities, arising 'only in the presentation of the world to us'; or
perhaps they will be acknowledged as genuine 'laws of control'of an external world.
According to Kilmister, the summary given in this work of the state of play in quantum
mechanics around 1926-7 essentially cemented into place Eddington's understanding of
the theory, with the exception of the Dirac equation to be mentioned below (as we shall
see, this is not quite the case).
Here too the selective subjectivism comes into play. Why are the properties of the
building we obtain ordered the way they are? The answer is that the theoretical world
building must converge to the mental world building which gives us familiar experiences:
'The Hamiltonian derivative has just that kind of quality which makes it stand out in our minds as an
active agent against a passive extension of space and time; and Hamiltonian differentiation is virtually the
symbol for creation of an active world out of the formless background. Not once in the dim past, but
continuously by conscious mind is the miracle of the Creation wrought.' (bid., p. 241)
In particular, these familiar experiences are subject to the mind's demand for permanence
and it is this which underpins the conservation laws and also gives rise to the illusion of
substantiality. Again, Eddington makes an allusion to picking out constellations from the
stars, so that this world building actually amounts to '... a selection from the patterns that
weave themselves' (ibid.).
As far as Eddington was concerned, the most suitable representation of the world
structure was through the tensor calculus. Indeed, he wrote that,
'I do not think it is too extravagant to claim that the method of the tensor calculus, which presents all
physical equations in a form independent of the choice of measure-code, is the only possible means of
studying the conditions of the world which are at the basis of physical phenomena.' (1923, p. 49)
It is not surprising, then, that Dirac's equation had a dramatic impact, expressed as it was in
terms of spinors (see Kilmister op. cit., Ch. 5). It prompted Eddington to elaborate and
investigate a new set of algebraic structures, described by what he called the 'wave-tensor'
calculus, which, he believed, would provide the bridge between relativity and quantum
theory. Furthermore, he maintained, the laws constituting this bridge have the above form
of mathematical identities and thus the construction of the bridge proceeds on the same
analytic basis. In particular, and famously, manipulation of this wave-tensor calculus
appeared to give the values of certain fundamental physical constants, such as the fine
                                                
15In the 1920 paper Eddington cites Weyl's gauge theoretic attempt to extend Einstein's theory to cover
electromagnetism (1920a, p. 156) and he persisted in regarding this as an 'essential part of the relativistic
conception' (1939, p. 28).
16Which is not to say that we are infallible. Eddington acknowledges that it may turn out that what we
are accustomed to measure with our instruments is not actually the thing conserved in the relevant law
(ibid., p. 239).
9structure constant17. As far as Eddington's contemporaries were concerned, this was
nothing more than a form of numerology which transformed into necessit es numbers
which were only contingent18. Dingle's criticism is representative: even supposing that
Eddington's mathematics is correct, it does not follow that his conclusions are strictly
'epistemological' since they depend on the choice of certain postulates and this choice is
ultimately guided, at least in part, by experience (Dingle op. cit., pp. 55-57)19.
There is the further question whether his mathematics is correct and answering this
is partly the aim of Kilmister's project (Kilmister op. cit.)20. It is also to show that
Eddington's manipulations, although apparently bizarre and poorly motivated, are perfectly
plausible from the perspective of his own philosophy. I'm not going to go through
Kilmister's courageous reconstruction here; all I want to do is emphasise the crucial role
played by considerations of particle indistinguishability in quantum mechanics.
The issue is that of constructing a bridge between quantum mechanics and
electromagnetism and, as the ratio between the Compton wavelength and classical electron
radius, the fine structure constant was seen by Eddington as the capstone of the bridge
(just as the speed of light was for the unification of electricity and magnetism; see
Eddington 1936, p. 4). Originally, measurements of the reciprocal of this constant (and it
is the reciprocal which Eddington persists in calling the fine structure constant) gave a
value of 136. Beginning with four algebraic elements, related to Di ac's operators and
decomposed into 3 + 1, Eddington generated a complex algebraic structure, applied to the
case of two particles not just one as for Dirac. This was for two reasons: first, in the
treatment of the hydrogen atom the electron and proton should be placed on an equal
footing; secondly, according to the principle of relativity, if the electron was the 'object'
particle, a 'comparison' particle also had to be introduced, representing, in idealised form,
the environment (Kilmister op. cit., p. 112).
As Kilmister points out, the whole project gains a certain plausibility if it is viewed
from a structuralist perspective: if physics is primarily the investigation of structures, then
the most appropriate tool for this investigation will be forms of mathematics in which
structure is paramount (ibid., p. 118)21. Kilmister somewhat downplays Eddington's
selective subjectivism here (and emphasises his form of operationalism according to which
the origin of a law is revealed by the 'unravelling' of the series of operations resulting in
the relevant physical quantity22) but I think he would admit that it is crucial in justifying
the very basis of Eddington's algebraic manipulations. This is precisely the purpose of
Eddington's 1928 discussion mentioned above. Finally, as Kilmister notes, although he
uses the phrase 'algebraic structure' to describe the mathematics employed, what Eddington
was primarily concerned with was group theory (Kilmister ibid., p. 118 and 119, fn. 1).
With regard to the last point, we have already touched on Eddington's enthusiasm for
tensors and, according to Kilmister, his conviction '... that here there is everything needed
to describe the 'condition of the world' simply rested on the prolific character of this
generation of [group-theoretic] representations ...' (ibid., p. 72). Eddington was also
                                                
17An attempt at a summary in the context of a popular exposition of his philosophy can be found in his
(1939, pp. 162-168).
18Pauli described it as 'romantic poetry, not physics' (Kilmister op. cit., p. 116).
19One such specific postulate that Dingle mentions is that the world can be described in terms of identical
particles (op. cit., p. 56).
20In a critical review of Eddington's Philosophy of Physical Science, Broad wrote 'It is greatly to be
wished that some competent mathematical physicist, with a critical rather than a creative intellect, should
undertake an "Examination of Eddington's Mathematics" comparable to my Examina ion of McTaggart's
Philosophy. It is possible that, although McTaggart was ploughed, Eddington might pass with honours.'
(Broad 1940, p. 312 - 'Sir Arthur Eddington's Phil sophy of Physical Science', Philosophy, 15 pp. 301-
312). I do not mean to suggest either that Kilmister is not possessed of a 'creative intellect' or that his
analysis demonstrates that Eddington does indeed pass with honours!
21Of course the structuralist should not be found guilty by association here! That structuralism in part
motivated Eddington's numerology should not be used to form the basis of some kind of modus tollens.
Indeed, since the numerology rests on selective subjectivism as well, the structuralist's attempt to detach
the latter should block this derogatory inference.
22Again, Eddington himself is careful to distinguish his approach from that of the logical positivists
(1939, p. 189).
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explicit in his insistence that the structure of the world is of a kind defined and investigated
by group theory (see Eddington 1936, Ch. XII and 1939, Ch. IX). However, it appears that
by the late 1920s/early 1930s, this group-theoretic structuralism was also motivated by the
implications of quantum mechanics for particle indistinguishability. These played a crucial
role in the rescue of his structuralist derivation of the fine structure constant when
experimental results revised the value of the latter from 136 to 137 (Eddington 1936).
Eddington was well aware of the philosophical implications of the new quantum
statistics and understood the non-classical indistinguishability of the particles to be the
logically prior notion. However, his understanding went beyond that of other physicists in
shaping his notion of 'interchange' (Kilmister ibid., pp. 130-132). Following a geometric
analogy with rotation, Eddington considered the conditions under which an interchange of
particles made no difference from an algebraic perspective. Such conditions provide a
representation of indistinguishability which he can then effectively feed into his algebraic
programme and by a great detail of jiggery-pokery obtain the desired result. The details
are once again given by Kilmister (ibid., Chs. 8 and 9) but there are two curious, not to say
bizarre, features of Eddington's use of indistinguishability which throw further light on his
form of structuralism. The first concerns a technical issue: Eddington not only had to
account for the revised value of the fine structure constant, but also had to accommodate
the fact that as applied to the hydrogen atom, Dirac's equation gave an extra term 1/137r,
where the 1/r acts like the Coulomb potential. Eddington's response was to argue that the
Coulomb force could be identified with Fermi-Dirac exclusion and hence was a
consequence of particle indistinguishability for fermions. The second feature is that, with
regard to the hydrogen atom, Eddington regarded the proton as indistinguishable from the
electron (Kilmister's gloss on this is uncharacteristically not as helpful as one would
wish).
In order to get a grip on these claims, we need to start with a principle which
Eddington himself identifies as thefundamental epistemological principle of this 1936
work, the 'Principle of the Blank Sheet'. The basic idea is that, in order to get the analysis
going, we must first formulate some kind of background in terms of which physical
phenomena can then be distinguished:
'To develop a theory of the characteristics which can be distinguished and of the measurement of the
distinction, we require a blank sheet to write on - not a sheet already scribbled over with vaguely
recognised distinctions.' (Eddington 1936, p. 32).
Thus we begin with intrinsically indistinguishable particles and spac -time frames (ibid.,
p. 33 and p. 56) in order that the relevant physical differences are introduced openly rather
than smuggled in via the initial assumptions23.
Such differences include mass and charge, of course, neither of which are regarded
by Eddington as intrinsic properties of the particles. Rest mass is nothing more than the
energy of the particle in an assembly of particles in statistical equilibrium (1936, p. 268
and p. 262). Similarly charge has its origins in the permutation of indistinguishable
particles (1929 paper; 1936, p. 283). This is what Eddington claims to have demonstrated
through the identification of the Coulomb force with the results of the Exclusion Principle.
The heuristic origins of this identification are not entirely clear and I shall simply note that
the basis of Eddington's demonstration is permutation invariance. As already indicated,
Eddington saw this as a 'new kind of relativity transformation' (ibid., p. 283) in which the
interchanges of indistinguishable particles is represented by a rotation of the system in
configuration space (this foreshadows more recent configuration space approaches to
particle indistinguishability)24. This allows the permutation to be represented as a
continuous transformation, as probability is gradually transferred from one 'identification'
to the opposite one (ibid., p. 284). The interchange nergy is then the momentum
conjugate to the permutation co-ordinate and it is this that Eddington claims is equal to the
                                                
23Thus one of the first distinctions to be scribbled on the sheet is that of the symmetry properties of his
algebraic elements (ibid., p. 40).
24There is a further anticipation of more generalised forms of statistics corresponding to higher order
symmetries (ibid., p. 290). Of course, for Eddington these correspond to 'non-minimum' charges.
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observable value of the Coulomb energy. Furthermore, and crucially, it is the addition of
this permutation co-ordinate which requires the extension of his original 136-dimension
phase space by a further dimension to provide the algebraic foundation of the (new value
for) the fine structure constant (ibid., p. 286).
Thus from the point of view of Eddington's analysis, protons and electrons begin
life, as it were, as completely indistinguishable units, to which various attributes are added
as the analysis proceeds:
'The Principle of the Blank Sheet requires that at the start we should recognise no intrinsic distribution
between the particles which we contemplate, in order that we may trace to their very source the origin of
those distinctions which we recognise in practical observation. The fundamental dynamics is the dynamics
of indistinguishable particles; the dynamics of distinguishable particles is a practical application to be
used when we do not wish to analyse the phenomena so deeply.' (ibid., p. 287)
Thus the mass cannot be used to distinguish a proton from an electron because it is
represented within quantum mechanics by  appropriate operator and this cannot be
applied to a given particle until we have first determined how that particle should be
identified at different times. To use mass as a criterion to distinguish particles presupposes
that they have already been distinguished (ibid.)25. More generally, the identification of
particles is always relative since a change in attributes uch as position or colour
(Eddington gives several illustrative examples involving different coloured balls
throughout the discussion) can always be effected by a shift in reference frame. Even the
permutation co-ordinate is not absolute in terms of observational meaning and all we can
do is adopt some conventional criterion for determining the constancy of the co-ordinate
and measure changes in it relative to this standard (ibid., p. 291)26.
The introduction of observation here and in the quote above suggests a role for
Eddington's selective subjectivism in his philosophical attitude towards
indistinguishability. As he puts it, there is nothing 'mystical' about the effects of
indistinguishability (ibid., p. 285), in the sense that they arise from some ontological
peculiarity of the particles, such as 'non-individuality', say. A being 'more gifted than
ourselves' could identify individual particles and apply the ordinary equations relevant for
distinguishable particles, but, crucially, the results obtained would be of no interest for,  or
use to, us because we have no access to the relevant observational data (ibid.). We are
unable to identify particles at different spatio-temporal locations and thus for Eddington
quantum indistinguishability is ultimately observational in origin. This is a familiar
position among physicists, but Eddington u derstands it within the framework of his
epistemology according to which this observational limitation is subjective. It may be
asked, why should the statistical behaviour of particles be affe t dby our inability to
distinguish them? As he says, this would be absurd or incredible, '... unless we bear in
mind the subjectivity of the world described by physics and of all that it is said to contain.'
(1939, p. 37). The question would be a legitimate one to ask with regard to wholly
objective particles displaying wholly objective behaviour but '... our generalisations about
their behaviour ... describe properties imposed by our procedure of observation ...' (ibid.)
Indistinguishability for Eddington is thus a form of epistemological principle; one can
imagine it being tested but the test would be perfunctory 'like the experimental verification
of propositions of Euclid' (ibid. - significant analogy?).
                                                
25We recall his earlier attitude towards clocks and rods in relativity theory noted above.
26See also the discussion in his final work (1946, pp. 50-51), where he writes that 'The supposed non-
interchangeability of the proton and electron is based on the mistaken assumption that we begin with free
information as to which of them is at x1.' (ibid., p. 51). This, he claims, also applied in classical
mechanics, giving, as an example, a double star whose components are so similar that a telescope cannot
distinguish them (interestingly, a similar example has been given more recently by Dalla Chiara and
Toraldo di Francia in their discussion of particle indistinguishability and proper names). He continues:
'The 'indistinguishability' of particles is best understood if we think of them as carriers. It does not apply
to the contents of the carriers, and it is to be noted that the contents include the mass and sign of charge as
well as less permanent characteristics.' (ibid.). This could be confusing since the notion of a 'carrier'
meshes well with that of substance which Eddington wants to reject, of course; cf. Cassirer's comments
on 'carriers'.
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There is a further distinction to be made. If the reduction of the Coulomb force to
Fermi-Dirac statistics is extended to cover all interaction forces, as Eddington believed it
could be (1939, p. 128), then interaction has a subjective origin due to indistinguishability.
There is a further subjectivity attached to the 'ultimate particles' which is strictly
independent of the former27. That these ultimate particles are 'identical structural units'
arises as a 'specialisation' of the concept of analysis, viewed as an ingrained form or 'frame'
of thought (ibid., p. 122). Apparently intrinsic attributes can be resolved into relational
ones, so that 'All the variety in the world, all that is observable, comes from the variety of
relations between entities.' (ibid.) but the entities themselves are precisely alike. And this is
not because the objective universe is built of such units but rather that our knowledge is
'impressed' by a fundamental form of thought (ibid., p. 123 and p. 125). Thus, the laws of
atomicity, which Eddington had earlier speculated might be objective, are brought within
the subjectivist fold, thanks, at least in part, to indistinguishability and permutation
invariance.
From this perspective, such a unit cannot be taken as separate or disassociated
from the system of analysis of which it is a part. Taken as it stands, this is quite general
but it becomes more precise when it is expressed mathematically, so that the relevant frame
of thought is transformed into a mathematical frame28. And the appropriate mathematics,
of course, is group theory (ibid., pp. 137-140)29. Here it is interesting that Eddington
doesn't tie the introduction of group theoryexplicitly to the presence of his identical
structural units. It comes in as a way of expressing the relationships between relations and
the important point is that whatever the nature of the entities, the use of group theory
allows us to abstract away the 'pattern' or structure of relationsbetween the entities30.
Knowledge of structure, therefore, is communicable whereas other forms of knowledge
(my knowledge of what something tastes like, for example) are not31. H nce, it is through
structure that we can have inter-subjective knowledge and Eddington proposes group
theory as the answer of modern physics to the old philosophical question, 'what sort of
thing is it that I know?':
'What sort of thing is it that I know? The answer is structure. To be quite precise, it is structure of the
kind defined and investigated in the mathematical theory of groups.' (ibid., p. 147)
The philosopher's perplexity arises from the assumption that knowledge of the external
world must be based on sensations, which are mental and hence the problem arises as to
how the mental can give us knowledge of the non-mental. The assumption is incorrect,
however, as a single sensation tells us nothing about the physical world. The logical
starting point of physical knowledge is '... knowledge of the group-structure of a set of
sensations in a consciousness.' (ibid., p. 148; Eddington's emphasis)32. These fragments
of structure are then collected together, represented through th  fundamental forms of
                                                
27The distinction between 'knowable' and 'objective' systems - criticised by Dingle (op. cit.) - plays a role
here (1939, p. 128).
28In an important sense what Eddington is tackling here is the problem of the applicability of
mathematics: 'The question to be discussed in this chapter is, At what point does the mathematician
contrive to get a grip on material which intrinsically does not seem particularly fitted for his
manipulations?' (ibid., p. 137).
29The above point that the unit cannot be disassociated from the structure then receives a mathematical
gloss: 'As a structural concept the part is a symbol having no properties except as a constituent of the
group-structure of a set of parts.' (ibid., p. 145).
30And this is how he solves the applicability problem: 'In this way mathematics gets a footing in
knowledge which intrinsically is not of a kind suggesting mathematical conceptions.' (ibid., p. 141).
31The mathematics i  essential because that is the only way in which the assertions of physical
knowledge can be restricted to structural knowledge. But this very mathematics then prevents access to
non-structural knowledge of what underlies the structure: 'Every path to knowledge of what lies beneath
the structure is then blocked by an impenetrable mathematical symbol.' (ibid., 142). This is strongly
reminiscent of Husserl's view, presented in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology, that mathematised nature, although responsible for so many scientific discoveries, also
conceals the 'meaning-fundament' (in the life-world) of the theories discovered by it (Husserl 1970).
32
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thought and completed by inference to unobservable structures to give the 'structure
[formerly] known as the physical universe.' Thus,
'Physical science consists of purely structural knowledge, so that we know only the structure of the
universe which it describes. This is not a conjecture as to the nature of physical knowledge; it is precisely
what physical knowledge as formulated in present-day theory states itself to be. In fundamental
investigations the conception of group-structure appears quite explicitly as the starting point; and nowhere
in the subsequent development do we admit material not derived from group-structure.' (ibid., p. 142-
143).
Note that group theory enters both at the bottom level, as it were, in representing the
structure of sensations, and at the top-most theoretical level, in representing the structure of
the ultimate theoretical elements33. That the sensations themselves are non-structural, and
our knowledge of them is by direct awareness, might seem to resurrect a form a dualism
but Eddington insists that this is a 'logical confusion' according to which we cannot give
meaning to the notion of dualism without making certain presuppositions which
undermine that very dualism (ibid., pp. 150-151). The idea is this:if we conceptually
distinguish that part of the world of which we have direct awareness, namely that part
which has to do with our sensations, from that part of which we have structural knowledge,
then structurally the latter is no different from the former. Yet in order to give meaning to
the dualism we would have to suppose that we have some non-structural knowledge of that
part by which we could assess its difference from the sensational part. But that is to
suppose that we could have direct awareness of the structural part which would show that
it is non-sensational. But that is impossible, for if we had direct awareness of it, then it
would be sensational; hence the very possibility of dualism is undermined34.
This issue, of the relationship between the structural and non-structural
components of our knowledge, is obviously a fundamental one. Thus the ordinary 'frames
of thought' which, as indicated above, are transformed by mathematics feature non-
structural, 'general' concepts, from which structural concepts are obtained by eliminating
everything which is not essential to the role the concept plays in a group-structure. If the
structural concept becomes a mere element, whose properties are those of a mathematical
symbol, then a general concept '... is our conception of what the symbol represents in our
ordinary non-mathematical form of thought.' (ibid., p. 144). However, with the exception
of those general concepts concerning things of which we are directly aware, such concepts
- albeit ingrained as ordinary forms of thought- may be no more than forms of 'self-
deception' which persuade us '... we have an apprehension of something which we cannot
apprehend.' (ibid., p. 144). I mention this because it can be made to relate to the
motivations for ontic structural realism mentioned above: we have a general concept of an
object as an individual, which is so ingrained as a form of thought that we export it from
the classical to quantum realm and are persuaded that we have an apprehension of that
which we cannot apprehend. All that we can apprehend, following Eddington, is the
                                                
33It is interesting to note that although Born argued vehemently against Eddington's over-emphasis on
theory (he considered the latter's ideas to be a 'considerable danger to the sound development of science';
1943, p. 2) he drew on the analysis of sense impressions offered by Gestalt psychology to argue that ' ...
the 'shapes' of physical things are the invariants of the equations' (ibid., p. 12) and that these have the
same kind of objective reality as any shape of more familiar things (see also Born 1956, p.163). Cassirer
also approached the results of Gestalt psychology from a group-theoretical perspective in his (1944).
34As Eddington acknowledges, that structuralism 'abolishes' dualism had been previously noted by
Russell, for example, and at this point in the text Eddington recalls a passage from Introduction to
Mathematical Philosophy which concludes that the difference between structural and non-structural
knowledge '... must lie in just that essence of individuality which ways eludes words and baffles
description, but which for that very reason is irrelevant to science.' The difference between Russell's
position in 1919 and Eddington's in 1939, or so Eddington claims, is that in Russell's case structuralist
knowledge was regarded as '... the kernel of truth which would outlast the changing theories which
enhulled it' (Eddington op. cit.., p. 152), whereas by 1939 it was no longer hidden but had been dug out
from physical theories through the techniques of group theory (see the brief discussion of Braithwaite's
objection below).
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relevant group-theoretic structure, of course, as it is represented in terms of symmetric and
anti-symmetric state functions35.
Bizarrely perhaps, Eddington applies his distinction between 'general' and
'structural' concepts to the issue of what we mean by the term 'exist'. He rejects '... any
metaphysical concept of "real existence"' (ibid., p. 162) and introduces in its place a
'structural concept' of existence according to which it only makes sense to ask if a given
entity exists in the given structure or not. Since there are only two possibilities, existence
and non-existence (of course), 'Th  structural concept of existence is represented by an
idempotent symbol.' (1939, p. 162; Eddington's emphasis). Embodying the simplest
possible structure, an entity represented by such a symbol must have no parts and the
entity in physics corresponding to this element of analysis is, of course, the elementary
particle. Now an interesting question arises:from the perspective of individuality and
indistinguishability how are these particles to be regarded? As Eddington notes (1946, p.
131), this mathematical representation in terms of idempotent quantities encourages a
treatment of the particles as 'pseudo-individuals':
'It will not be surprising if in our gropings into the structure of things a legend of individuality has
attached itself to the carrier of an idempotent variate. In statistically grounded theory it is the closest
counterpart of the obsolete classical particle. We now know that matter cannot be analysed into elements
having the individual distinctness that classical particles were supposed to have; but in the carriers of
idempotent variates we reach elements which, though not less statistical than other carriers, do not betray
their statistical character in the ordinary calculations of dynamics.' (ibi .)36
According to Eddington, the association of this notion with idempotency has 'profound
implications' for the logical structure of physical science, involving, as it does, the transfer
of a metaphysics appropriate to th macroscopic realm, to the microscopic. What we
observe are macroscopic (Eddington uses the term 'molar') phenomena and underlying this
realm '... we are accustomed to picture a microscopic world populated by individuals ...
and it is further supposed that protons and electrons are such individuals.' (ibid.). Such a
picture encourages the view that the process of analysis has a terminus (in the individuals)
but if the only kind of individuality is actually this pseudo- form conferred by
idempotency, then there is no reason to suppose that the process will ever have to stop for
metaphysical reasons. We may decide to stop once we have achieved our analytical aims
but that is another matter entirely. Furthermore, once we realise that the analysis of
macroscopic objects into microscopic carriers has a goal that is mathematically, rather than
objectively, defined in this way, the numerological efforts of Eddington's programme may
not seem so implausible (or so he hopes; ibid., p. 132)37. From this perspective, then, 'the
elementary particle is a product of analysis of ... group structure.' (ibid., p. 164).
This programme was subjected to vigourous criticism by Braithwaite in his 1941
review of Philosophy of Physical Science (Braithwaite 1941). What's interesting  here is
to note the similarity between Braithwaite's objections to Eddington's structuralism and
Psillos' more recent concerns, as cited above, particularly with reg d to thestructure-
object distinction. Thus Braithwaite rejects as invalid what he sees as Eddington's
dichotomy between structure and the incommunicable 'Erkenntnis' of the content of
                                                
35Another example Eddington gives is that of space and his discussion is nicely suggestive of recent
structural realist accounts.
36With regard to the aspect of 'carriers' here, we recall the comments above.
37Here he appears to be referring to the work given in the final chapter, probably written on the last day
of his working life, in which he calculates the 'cosmical number' of protons and electrons in the universe
(1946, pp. 265-283). Issues of identity intrude again, when he writes, 'It may be asked, why should we
trouble to distinguish ... particles ... from one another, seeing that it is a fundamental tenet of quantum
theory that elementary particles have no distinctive identity? But, as we pointed out earlier, it is the
conception that matters - not whether the particles are distinguishable, but whether they are conceived as
distinct. Clearly, the physicist conceives electrons as distinct, otherwise he would not talk about
exchanging them; if they are continually exchanging identity, they must be conceived as having an
identity to exchange. We are not concerned with any metaphysical conception of identity, Whatever it is
that is exchanged - whether it is called 'identity' or merely a 'suffix' - has to have a structural equivalent.'
(1946, p. 273).
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experience (1940, p. 462). Focusing on the claimed group-theoretic nature of the structure,
Braithwaite insists that such groups are defined only with respect o given 'modes of
combination', so that the group structrure is in fact less abstract than Eddington supposes.
He writes,
'To say that two sets of things have the same group-structure would be to say noting of interest unless the
modes of combination of both the groups had been specified. The fact that structure depends upon content
is one reason why the structure-content dichotomy of knowledge is untenable.' (ibid., p. 463)
In other words, the group-structure is only given once the relevant transformations have
been specified (i.e. whether we're talking about rotations or permutations, for example), but
to do this is to supply content and so we no longer have pure structure. This appears to be
analogous to Psillos' argument which, the latter claims, leads to the collapse of epistemic
structural realism (op. cit.).
Even more interesting, in this lattercontext, is that in a footnote to the above
passage, Braithwaite refers to Newman's famous result that for any collection of objects of
a given cardinality, the claim that there exists a particular structure, expressed in terms of
the relevant relations, defined over this set, can be trivially satisfied (see, for example, the
discussions in Demopolous and Friedman (1995) and Psillos (op. cit., pp. 63-65)). Thus
he writes,
'... his [Newman's] strictures ar  applicable to Eddington's group-structure. If Newman's conclusive
criticism had received proper attention from philosophers, less nonsense would have been written during
the last twelve years on the epistemological virtue of pure structure.' (Braithwaite op. cit., p. 463).
Eddinsgton's reply is revealing. With regard to Braithwaite's claim that a group is only
defined with respect to a particular 'mode of combination', Eddington points out that what
Braithwaite appears to have in mind here are group representations, whereas in order to
represent the 'pattern of interweaving', he has been talking about abstractroups. And it is
precisely the abstract aspect hat renders the concept of a group so useful in the
philosophy of physics. From this perspective we lose the distinction between the nature of
the element and the nature of the combining relaiton which makes it an element of the
group: 'The element is what it is because of its relation to the group structure.' (Eddington
1941, p. 269; his emphasis). Since the elements of the abstract group are operators, the
combining relation emphasised by Braithwaite, is taken up into the manner in which the
elements operate. Eddington continues,
'... I must insist that I am rescuing out of the mathematical formalism what it is for physical purposes
the most essential feature of the group conception of structure, namely, that primarily the elements of a
group (or ring or algebra) are defined solely by their role in that group (or ring or algebra). Therefore when
Braithwaite argues that it is possible to regard the elements of a group in such a way that they are not
elements of a group, I answer that there is no other way of regarding them. Unless we import qualities not
inherent in them by definition (by adopting a special realisation or representation of the group [and as he
notes he means this in the non-technical sense] there is nothing to lay hold of that could be regarded from
another point of view.' (ibid., p. 269).
There are a couple of things to note about this. First of all, it is important to bear in mind
that the elements of the algebra should not be identified with the elements of the group, of
course (more here?). But then the worry is that by shifting from the group to the
associated algebra, Eddington might have evaded the issue somewhat. In stating that an
element 'is what it is' by virtue of its relation to the group structure, Eddington is not quite
offering a version of the ontic form of structural realism which sees particles as being what
they are by virtue of their relation to the overall structure, since the 'element' for Eddington,
here, is an operation, like rotation (see below). Secondly, however, there is a feature of this
form of structural realism present in Eddington's remarks that there is no non-group-
theoretic content to 'lay hold of'. In this case, Eddington agrees that there is no structure-
content dichotomy, not because str cture depends on content but rather because it is
content - as represented in this case by Braithwaite's 'combining relations' - that depends
on the structure. This dialectic is nicely mirrored in the present day differences between
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Psillos, in responding to Worrall by insisting that the latter's distinction between structure
and content is untenable in the scientific context, and Ladyman in arguing that the
structure-content distinction collapses because all the physical 'content' can be cashed out
in structural terms.
Referring to Newman's criticism of Russell Eddington argues that,
'Russell, in his pioneer development of structuralism, did not get so far as the concept of group-structure.
He had glimpsed the idea of a purely abstract structure; but since he did not concern himself with the
technical problem of describing it, he had no defence against Newman's criticisms. Russell's vague
conception of structure was a pattern of entities, or at most a pattern of relations; but the elements of
group theory make it clear that pure structure is only reached by considering a pattern of interweaving, i.e.
a pattern of interrelatedness of relations [and here Eddington refers to The Philosophy of Physical Science,
pp. 137-140].' (Eddington 1941, p. 278).
As an example of what he means by this 'pattern of interrelatedness of relations',
Eddington presents the algebra of operators representing rotations acting on rotations, for
which the 'pattern of interrelatedness' is manifested in the associated multiplication table.
The information encoded in such a table is by no means trivial and hence Eddington feels
able to conclude that there is no foundation to Braithwaite's contention that the Newman
objection applies to the structure as described by this multiplication table; indeed, he
accuses Braithwaite of not having grasped 'the main idea' of structuralism.
A further indication of what Eddington had in mind is given in his example of spin,
where the information encoded, as above, in the relevant structure gives all the information
we can get (ibid., p. 279). What's particularly interesting here is the way in which
Eddington deploys a certain structuralist strategy which amounts to assuming certain non-
structural elements in order to be able to articulate the structure in the first place, only to
discard these elements once the structure has been constructed (see French 1999; French
and Ladyman forthcoming; the strategy can be traced back to Poincaré's approach to
geometry, where he refers to objects as a kind of 'crutch' which eventually is thrown away).
Thus he notes that the components of spin can be specified in a set of mutually orthogonal
planes and also that this represents non-trivial knowledge. Now of course, the Newman-
Braithwaite objection would be that such knowledge is non-structural because we are
acquainted with such orthogonal planes in the 'external' world. The way round it is to
consider the set of operations represented by rotations through 90o in each of the planes.
This yields a group-multiplication table which Eddington takes to define the relevant
structure and now '[w]e need ... trouble no further about the planes;' (op. cit., p. 279). We
initially associated the components of spin with the planes but we could equally as well
have associated them with unit rotations in the plane, so that initial association was just a
kind of heuristic move which takes us to the group-multiplication table which in turn
represents what is important, namely the structure. The information encoded in the latter is
definitely non-trivial, since it conflicts with other statements, some plausible, but the
apparent non-structural knowledge acquired by our acquaintance with the planes is in fact
'non-existent'. Thus the appearance of a non-structural componentis illusory, deriving
from the heuristic role played by certain objects38.
There is much more to say of course, but I want to conclude this historical section,
finally, by reflecting on the forms of structuralism proposed by Cassirer and Eddington39.
In both cases, they appear to offer a strong dose of Kantian epistemology with their
structuralism. Of course, we have to be a little careful with the labels here. Eddington
himself wrote, 'We do not accept the Kantian label; but, as a matter of acknowledgment, it
is right to say that Kant anticipated to a remarkable extent the ideas to which we are now
being impelled by the modern development of physics.'(1939, pp. 188-189). And as
Ryckman notes, by historicizing the inquiry into the conditions of the possibility of
knowledge, Cassirer moves away from Kant in conceiving of synthesis as a
                                                
38There are further interesting aspects of this debate, concerning Eddington's attempted derivation of his
'E'-algebra from his 'structural concept' of existence and also his view of relations, but I will leave these
for another opportunity.
39Of course, Cassirer and Eddington disagreed over the impact of quantum mechanics on the principle of
causality (see, for example, Cassirer op. cit., pp. 60-61 fn. 4).
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methodological requirement. Nevertheless, his account of objectivity and the constitution
of objects possesses clear idealist characteristics. As indicated in French and Ladyman
(forthcoming), the modern structural realist might want to avail herself of the structural
analysis of objects, whilst articulating an alternative account of physical law, for example.
Of course, as far as Cassirer is concerned, this would be to impale oneself on one horn of
the 'old dilemma' of phenomenalism vs. naive realism which his structural understanding
of objectivity is intended to avoid (op. cit., pp. 142ff).
Turning to Eddington, in one sense, his view is clearly epistemological: the world is
not entirely structural. However, all our physical knowledge is knowledge only of structure
and so we cannot have physical knowledge of these non-structural spects. It is this
perhaps that non-structuralists find so repugnant; in Eddington we see the Kantian
noumena acquire a mystical resonance. But as we have seen, it is not quite that simple. The
particles of physics are not to be found in the non-structural world; as far as Eddington is
concerned, such a suggestion would be completely absurd. Thus the standard realist's cry
that this epistemic structuralism leaves something beyond the reach of physics,
belabouring as she is under the misapprehension that this something should be within the
reach of physics, would be regarded with something approaching derision. There was
never any possibility that this aspect could be grasped by physics because it could only be
so if it were structural in the first place. Thus we cannot set Eddington beside Worrall in
holding that when it comes to the particle of physics say, what we know are the structural
relations they enter into but their 'natures' lie hidden. From the synthetic point of view, of
course, we start with individual particles and combine them to form perceptible objects
(Eddington 1939, p. 220) but from the analytic perspective of Eddington's programme, it is
the relation (between phenomena) which comes first and the elementary particle emerges
as the product of analysis of the group structure. This aspect, of course, is closer to ontic
structuralism but for Eddington to be placed next to Ladyman we would have to dispense
with the selective subjectivism. Kilmister seems to think we can understand Eddington's
structuralism without this but I'm not convinced40. If we could cleanly excise it, however,
we would lose the distinction between the structural and non-structural, or physical and
'external' worlds, leaving a form of ontic structuralism.
The Group-Theoretic Conception of Objects
It is odd that neither Cassirer nor Eddington appear to refer to the introduction of group
theory into quantum mechanics by Weyl and Wigner. As Weyl noted, this hinged on the
identification of two different kinds of symmetries: spatio-temporal symmetries, such as
the rotational symmetry associated with the representation of the atomic nucleus as a fixed
centre of force; and permutation symmetry, or invariance under a particle permutation.
Given Cassirer's understanding of spatio-temporal symmetries, and their incorporation
into his epistemology, we might speculate that he saw little that was particularly new in
these developments, from the structuralist perspective. Eddington, on the other hand, did
make an explicit attempt to accommodate permutation invariance within his account, but he
gave it a particular geometric twist as I indicated above. Weyl, however, clearly recognised
the import of this new symmetry and not only explored its physical consequences in The
Theory of Groups and Quantum  Mechanics but later, in The Philosophy of Mathematics
and Natural Sciences, considered in more detail its philosophical implications. As I have
noted elsewhere, that Weyl was aware that here was a new aspect of symmetry in the world
goes some way to responding to Donini's perplexity over why, in Th  Theory of Groups
..., he appeared to have forgotten all his work on ‘relativity and invariance matters’ (Donini
1987, p. 109). It’s not a question of forgetting the latter but of focusing on a new
fundamental symmetry.
Mackey characterises the formal moves in terms of two, intertwined sets of
developments: what can be called the 'Weyl programme', which saw group theory as a way
of bringing order to the collection of principles and ad hoc rules that constituted quantum
                                                
40On this point, Broad also claimed that the two can be separated: 'I do not think there is much
connection between the "selective subjectivism" and the "structuralism" of Eddington's theory. Of course
both of them may be true. But the structuralism might be true and important, so far as I can see, even if
the selective subjectivism were false or greatly exaggerated.' (op. cit., p. 312)
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mechanics in the late 1920s, and setting the foundations of the theory on a secure basis;
and the 'Wigner programme' which saw group theory as a way of bypassing the
computational intractability associated with tackling the dynamics head on. Of course, both
Weyl and Wigner made important contributions to each. Wigner, in particular,further
extended the reach of group theory within physics by applying it both to the nucleus41
(see French 2000) and elementary particles. This latter extension was presented by
Wigner at the 1935 'Pittsburgh Symposium on Group Theory and Quantum Mechanics'
(Wigner 1935)42 where he notes the 'unique correspondence' between possible Lorentz
invariant equations of quantum mechanics and the representations of the inhomogeneous
Lorentz group. Such a representation, ' ... though not sufficient to replace the quantum
mechanical equations entirely, can replace them to a large extent.' (Wigner 1939, p. 151) It
can give the change through time of a physical quantity corresponding to a particular
operator, but not the relationships holding between operators at a given time. The issue
then is to determine the irreducible representations of this group and these are established
in Wigner's famous 1939 paper43.                                               
It is this work of Wigner's - specifically, the association of ‘elementary physical
systems’ with irreducible representations of the inhomogeneous Lorentz group - which is
drawn upon by Castellani in her analysis of the group theoretic constitution of objects.
From Objectivity to Object
According to Weyl, ‘objectivity means invariance with respect to the group of
automorphisms [of space-time]’ (Weyl, 1952). On the basis of this statement, Castellani
presents an ‘objectivity condition’ (for the physical description of world), namely
invariance with respect to the space-time symmetry group. The issue then is to move from
objectivity to objects:
‘What is of interest, from the point of view of the object question, is how this objectivity condition for
the laws of physics can be used with regard to the determination of ‘objects’ within a given physical
domain.’ (Castellani 1993, p. 108)
The basis for such a move is precisely Wigner's association of an ‘elementary system’
with an irreducible representation of the space-time symmetry group, such that the set of
states of the system constitutes a representation space for the irreducible representation.
For quantum systems, the appropriate representation space will be the Hilbert space, of
course. The labels of the irreducible representations are thus associated with values of the
invariant properties characterising the systems. Further details are given in Castellani 1993
and 1998 - more here?
Two issues then arise. First of all, what this group-theoretic construction yields are
classes or kinds of particles, not distinct objects (Castellani 1993, p. 109; 1998, p. 183-
184). As Castellani puts it,
'The invariant properties which are ascribed to a 'particle-object' on the basis of group-theoretical
considerations - as, for example, definite properties of mass and spin are ascribed to a (quantum) particle
which is associated with an irreducible representation of the Poincaré group - are necessary for determining
that given particle (an electron couldn;t be an electronwithout given properties of mass and spin), but
they are not sufficient for distinguishing it from other similar particles. In addition to these 'necessary'
                                                
41It is in this context that Eddington does refer to Wigner, although the group-theoretical basis of the
latter's 'theory of the nucleus' does not rate a mention (Eddington 1946, p. 205).
42Recalling Eddington's reaction to the Dirac equation, this symposium also featured a paper by Breit on
group theoretic applications to Dirac's theory.
43It is interesting that the abstract of the 1935 presentation indicates that a detailed discussion of this
work was supposed to appear in a joint paper with Dirac 'who first perceived this problem.' I don't know
if such a joint project was ever begun. In the 1939 paper, Wigner again acknowledges Dirac, stating that
the topic of the paper was suggested by him as early as 1928 and that even then, Dirac realised the
connection between representations and the equations of quantum mechanics (1939, p. 156). The paper is
presented as the outgrowth of 'many fruitful conversations', especially during 1934/5. Dirac also published
his own work in this area, presenting more elegant derivations of Majorana's results on the classification
of representations of the Lorentz group. As Wigner notes, his results provide aposteriori justifications of
the work of Dirac and Majorana.
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properties (sometimes called 'essential' properties), one does need further specifications in order to
constitute a particle as an individual object.' (1993, p. 109)
Secondly, in addition to spatio-temporal symmetries, there is the permutation symmetry
which needs to be accommodated within this approach. Let us consider each of thes
issues in turn.
With regard to the first issue, we need something else to give ‘individual objects’;
Castellani identifies this something else as 'imprimitivity'. This was originally introduced
by Mackey in the 1950s (see Mackey, 1978), although it is implicit in Wigner's 1939
work, and it has been notably applied to the efinition of physical particles by Piron
(1976). The basic idea is to use the notion of a 'system of imprimitivity' associated with a
symmetry group in order to determine 'individuating' observable quantities uch as
position and momentum and thus move from kinds to individual objects by supplementing
the above group-theoretic account.
Putting things somewhat crudely, we obtain an imprimitivity system in the
following way: we associate with a system, in addition to the group G, a configuration
space S (strictly a Borel space) on which G acts. A projection valued measure is then
defined on S (where a projection valued measure is a mapping from a Borel subset of S to
the relevant projection operator) and if the projection valued measure satisfies a certain
identity (Ux-1PEUx = PEx-1; where PE is a projection operator and U is a unitary
representation) then the projection valued measure constitutes a ‘system of imprimitivity’
for U based on S. The importance of the system of imprimitivity associated with U is that
it determines the structure of U as an induced repres ntation (Mackey op. cit. p. 71;
Varadarajan 1970/1968 Ch. 9). In particular, if S is transitive and L is a unitary
representation of a closed subgroup of G, then the equivalence class of L is uniquely
determined by the pair U,P, where P is a system of imprimitivity for U and the commuting
algebra for L is isomorphic to the subalgebra consisting of all bounded linear operators
that commute with all PE (Mackey op. cit., pp. 71-72). This amounts to a statement of the
'imprimitivity theorem' (more here???) which has a number of important applications.
The virtues of imprimitivity have been extolled by Varadarajan, who writes that
‘The approach through systems of imprimitivity enables one to view in a unified context many apparently
separate parts of quantum mechanics - such as the commutation rules, the equivalence of wave and matrix
mechanics, the correspondence principle, and so on. The same treatment leads moreover in a natural
fashion to the notion of spin ...’ (Varadarajan 1970, p. viii).
In particular, if S denotes physical space (3 dimensional, Euclidean, affine), and G is now
the Euclidean group of all rigid motions of space, then the position of a particle, regarded
as an ‘S valued observable’, can be described by a projection valued measure defined on
S. The relevant projection operator is then the self-adjoint operator corresponding to the
real-valued observable which has the value 1 when the particle is ‘in’ Borel sub-set/at a
given position and 0 when it is not. If we impose the requirement that the description of
the system be covariant with respect to G, then the projection operator must satisfy the
identity which renders the projection valued measure a system of imprimitivity.
Introducing momentum observables and applying certain group-theoretic results, one can
then obtain the usual commutation relations, not by analogy with the Poisson brackets of
classical mechanics but as a consequence of Euclidean invariance (Mackey Ch. 18;
Varadarajan Ch. 11)44.
Furthermore, one can show that every irreducible representation of the
commutation rules is equivalent to the Schrödinger representation. The apparently special
choices in the latter for representing position and momentum observables are in fact the
most general ones possible subject to the commutation rules, if we assume irreducibility.
                                                
44 There is the possibility of further underdetermination here: ‘Given any quantum system with a complex
Hilbert space defining the logic, we may obtain another whose logic is defined by a real Hilbert space by
simply composing the given one with a new independent system whose logic is the set of all subspaces
of a real two-dimensional Hilbert space.’ (p. 197). According to Mackey, the ambiguity can be analyzed
and ‘to some extent removed’ by the application of group theoretic notions.
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On this basis, it is claimed, we can prove the isomorphism of Schrödinger wave mechanics
(based on the Schrödinger epresentation) and matrix mechanics (based on the
commutation rules only) (Varadarajan op. cit. p. 151). And the results just keep on
coming: if the relevant configuration space is affine, we get the Born interpretation of |y |2
and an ‘illustration’ of complementarity in the sense that one can show that no single state
exists in which both position and momentum can be localised sharply (Varadarajan ibid.,
pp. 154-155)
As far as the current discussion is concerned, the important point arising from all
this is that, ‘All we need to discuss physical events are position observables and a dynamic
group.’ (Mackey op. cit. p. 195). In particular, through the imposition of a condition of
covariance for observables, imprimitivity allows us to accommodate, in group theoretic
terms, the spatio-temporal location of particles (Pi on 1976, pp. 93-95). According to
Castellani, this restores the notion of an object  and thus we get the group theoretic
characterisation (or for her, constitution) of not only kinds but individual objects:
‘The aim is to arrive at a definition of a particle by determining “individuating” observable quantities
(such as the position and momentum) with the help of the imprimitivity systems.’ (Castellani 1998, p.
190)
Now this is not what the structuralist wants45!
So let us consider the philosophical implications of the above formal moves in a
little more detail. First of all, these moves have not reintroduced ‘substance’ of course (we
recall Cassirer's point about the constancy of the relation not implying the constancy of the
carrier). However, what we appear to have arrived at, via this long detour through group
theory, is nothing less than the good ol’ ‘bundle theory’ of individual objects, according
to which such objects are regarded as nothing more than a 'bundle' of properties, with
spatio-temporal location typically privileged as that property which confers individuality,
distinguishability and (classically at least) reidentifiability. As Castellani makes clear in her
discussion of imprimitivity,
'The view at issue here is that according to which individuality is conferred upon an object by some of its
properties and, in particular, by space-time properties.' (1998, p. 193 fn. 21)
Now the bundle theory, as usually understood, requires some form of the Principle of
Identity of Indiscernibles in order to effectively guarantee individuation and as we all
know, the status of this Principle is problematic n quantum mechanics (for a recent
discussion see Massimi forthcoming). I'm not going to get into that discussion again,
except to note the following: on the one hand, from the perspective of the configuration
space approach a form of the Identity of Indiscernibles is manifested by the removal of
coincidence points in the relevant configuration space. This, in turn, is effectively written
into the guidance equations of Bohm theory (Brown et. al. 1999) and thus the latter can be
understood as embodying a metaphysics of individual particles46. On the other, if one
were to accept the well known arguments that the Identity of In iscernibles i at best
inapplicable, at worst violated in quantum physics, one would have an ontology of bundles
which aren’t tied together. This amounts to an ontology of non-individual objects
described by something like qua/quasi-set theory.
Our long discussion of group theory and systems of imprimitivity seems to have
led us right back to where we started, namely the underdetermination between individuality
and non-individuality. Is there a way the structural realist can accommodate the central
insight of Mackey’s comment above without being committed to objects that are either
individuals or non-individuals? A possible response is to understand imprimitivity as
giving a group-theoretic grasp on the position of a 'particle' (perhaps understood as Bell’s
'beable') but to insist that this does not yield objecthood (beables don't give objects). In
other words, we can buy into the whole group-theoretic analysis/reduction of 'objects' but
                                                
45A point that has also been made by Chakravarrty.
46A rather peculiar metaphysics, granted, in which certain fundamental properties, which are r garded
classically as 'intrinsic', are 'shared', in some sense, between the particle and the quantum potential.
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simply resist the exportation of position, say, beyond the temporally limited domain of the
immediately observable and into the realm of quantum objects as a whole47. The questi n
now is, what kind of ontological picture does this give?
First of all, position can be regarded as yielding, not individuality per se, but only a
kind of ‘pseudo-individuality’, as noted above, or what Toraldo di Francia refers to as
'mock individuality’ in the sense that one can pretend the particles are individual objects at
the point of measurement, as it were, but only temporarily (Toraldo di Francia 1985; Dalla
Chiara and Toraldo di Francia 1993). It is significant that this notion is articulated in the
context of what can be taken as a form of structuralism48, according to which particles are
regarded as 'nomological' objects in the sense that '... physical objects are today knots of
properties, prescribed by physical laws' (1978, p. 63). It is in this context that Dalla Chiara
and Toraldo di Francia develop their view of quantum particles as 'anonymou ' in the
sense that proper names cannot be attached to them, although here too there is a tension
between this and the underlying structuralism. However, the important point is that
pseudo-individuality allows us to refer to 'objects', without compromising our
structuralism49:
'This is why an engineer, when discussing a drawing, can temporarily make an exception to the
anonymity principle and say: "Electron a, issued from point S, will hit the screen at P, while electron b,
issued from T, will land at Q."' (1985, p. 209; Dalla Chiara and Toraldo di Francia op. cit., p. 266)
Furthermore, a more congenial metaphysical framework for this structuralist view
of objects might be found in trope theory. The basic idea here is that a 'trope' is a particular
instance of a property, such as Bush's inarticulateness (is that a word , never mind a
trope?!) and the proclaimed advantage is that, with both particulars and properties
constructed out of, or reduced to, tropes, we get a parsimonious one category ontology
(see Bacon 1997)50. Trope bundle theory represents an object as, surprise, surprise, a
bundle of such tropes, rather than universal properties per se, but, again, some principle is
required to tie the bundle together. In this case, Identity of Indiscernibles, as standardly
formulated, would be inappropriate, and typically the second-level relation of compresence
is invoked. Mertz (1996) has criticised this on the grounds that compresence simply
cannot provide the level of unity required to bundle the tropes together into an object:
'Tropes have no 'attaching' aspect; their unity or 'togetherness' in constituting a thick particular must be
accounted for by positing some uniquely ordained relation of 'compresence', which, to perform its ontic
duty, must be predicative - that is, actually relating. Yet, as required of all relations in trope theory ...
compresence reduces to monadic properties of the subject tropes so related and hence can be but further
tropes, which, by the theory, are nonpredicative. Consequently, thick particulars dissolve back into
disjoint atomistic tropes, and the goal in positing a compresence relation is defeated.' (ibid., pp. 27-28).
                                                
47Since I've mentioned Bell's beables, it is worth noting that in the context of Bohm theory one can
dispense with trajectories. In his comparison/synthesis of Everett and Bohm (‘Measurement Theory of
Everett/de Broglie’s Pilot Wave’) Bell takes the lesson from Everett to be that ‘... if we do not like these
trajectories we can simply leave them out. We could just as well redistribute the configuration (x1, x2,
...) are random (with weight |y |2) from one instant to the next. For we have no access to the past, but
only to memories, and these memories are just part of the instantaneous configuration of the world.’
(Speakable and Unspeakable ..., p. 98).
48 Thus he refers to the process of 'objectuation' by which the mind 'decomposes' the world into objects
(1978, p. 58; see also Toraldo di Francia 1981, p. 220 - The Investigation of the Physical World, CUP)
Crucially, '... objectuation is strictly connected with, or consists of, the mind's ability to distinguish this
and other' (ibid.). Further discussion can be found in French and Krause forthcoming (book).
49With regard to the issue of how one can have structures (as relational) without objects (the relata), one
can understand this pseudo-individuality as allowing us to introduce a notion of object, as a descriptive
convenience, on the basis of which we can employ group theory, but which can subsequently be discarded
once we have a grip on the relevant structures as described by the mathematics (French 1999; French and
Ladyman forthcoming).
50Tropes also do useful service in acting as truth-makers for non-existential propositions about
particulars.
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Simons' approach avoids this form of criticism by replacing compresence with a
form of Husserlian 'foundation relation':
'An electron must have a certain mass, charge and spin, and in addition is variably endowed with a
position relative to other things and with a velocity and acceleration in particular directions at any time.
When individual tropes require other individual tropes we say they are rigidly dependent or founded on
these. When founding is mutual then a group of tropes must either all exist or none do. The mass, charge
and spin of an electron must coexist, they require each other and form a bundle. A bundle consisting of all
the tropes mutually founding one another directly or indirectly we may call a nucleus.' (Simons 2000,
p.148; see also Simons 1994).
Tropes may also require other tropes as members of a kind and in such cases, instead of
'founding' we have 'generic dependence', with the tropes generically required forming a
'halo'.
Further reasons for rejecting compresence are derived from examples in physics.
Thus, Simons argues, compresence is neither necessary nor sufficient for tropes to form a
bundle:
'... it is not necessary because a trope bundle may be widely distributed, as in particle pair formation
where paired tropes constituting electromagnetic polarisation or spin may be vastly separated yet mutually
dependent. It is not sufficient because more than one trope bundle can be compresent as when two or more
electrons occupy the same shell of an atom.' (ibid., p. 148).
In other words, compresence cannot do the job because of quantum non-locality and
indistinguishability! Replacing compresence by the above notion of rigid dependence or
founding is supposed to accommodate examples like these. Of course, compresence does
not disappear from the picture entirely, as it may still be concomitant. If the trope bundle
theory is sufficiently 'flexible', th nperhaps it can cover both pseudo-individuals nd
structures: a pseudo-individual is a bundle of compresent tropes, whereas a structure, or
'kind-structure', in the above sense, is a bundle of tropes which are not compresent51. This
is not to say that the physics somehow requires trope theory; it may be that some form of
bundle theory of individuality can do the same job, but at least we don't have substance and
we don't have the Identity of Indiscernibles52.
What about the second issue? How are we to understand the action of the
permutation group? In the final section I'd like to explore this question in the light of two
options, attached to each of the 'horns' of the metaphysical underdetermination with which
we started.
Option 1: the particles are regarded as individual objects and permutation symmetry is
either regarded as a property of the particles themselves, or, more plausibly but still
problematically, as an emergent property of the assembly;
Option 2: permutation symmetry reflects the metaphysically weird nature of quantum
objects as non-individuals.
And I shall conclude that Huggett's attempt to avoid either option leads us back to
structural realism.
The Ontological Status of Permutation Symmetry53
Let me begin with the first option. If permutation symmetry is regarded as an intrinsic
property and intrinsic properties are understood as delineating natural kinds, then electrons,
                                                
51How we 'get' from the structures to the pseudo-individuals is part and parcel of the measurement
problem.
52Trope theory may also be congenial to structuralism insofar as some trope theorists emphasise and
defend the irreducible nature of relations (see, for example, Mertz 1996). Of course, they don't go so far as
to allow relations in the absence of relata (they're not that mad) but it is, perhaps, not such a huge step to
go from the view of relations as ontoglial to the view of them as ontological.
53What follows is an expanded version of the final section of (French forthcoming).
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say, obeying different statistics - which is a possibility raised by violations of the spin-
statistics theorem - would constitute different such kinds by virtue of possessing a different
'kind' of permutation symmetry. The particles of each such kind would still be
indistinguishable, of course, and in a way that generates problems for the identity of
indiscernibles and hence the bundle theory of individuality. And if we were to reject the latter
and adopt some form of Transcendental Individuality, then this option of understanding
permutation symmetry as an intrinsic property is still problematic, as Hilborn and Yuca have
recently spelled out (preprint).
First of all, the only thing that would distinguish these electrons of different kinds
would be their permutation symmetry; in all other respects they are indistinguishable. If two or
more such electrons were to come together in an atomic system, the question arises as to
which statistics would dominate (Hilborn and Yuca ibi ., p. 41). Perhaps we would need some
form of 'meta-quantum statistics' to answer it! Mor  fundamentally, as Hilborn and Yuca
emphasise, we don't measure the permutation symmetry of individual particles; more than one
particle is needed. Thus, as a property in this intrinsic sense, the permutation symmetry of the
individual particle can be regarded as 'empirically superfluous'. For these sorts of reasons,
Hilborn and Yuca reject this option. Instead they prefer a 'holistic' perspective which can
accommodate the 'emergent' quality. Permutation symmetry 'emerges' at the collective level as
a property, not of the particles themselves, but of the quantum state.
They argue that the possibilities of non-standard statistics and violations of the spin-
statistics theorem in general can be accommodated quite naturally within this framework:
'This holistic point of view is both more faithful to the possibilities of physics (including possible violations
of the spin-statistics connection) and a stronger philosophical stance. It also has the merits of simplicity and
efficiency. On this account, permutation symmetry is a property of the collective state of the identical
particles, not an intrinsic property to be associated with each particle.' (op. cit., p. 44).
However, some care needs to be taken concerning what this holistic point of view amounts to.
Hilborn and Yuca understand Redhead and Teller to be arguing in its favour, particularly with
regard to '[t]he fact that holism places no epistemological limitations on the observer' (ibid., p.
46). Redhead and Teller themselves understand the metaphysics of this holism in terms of
non-individual quanta; on such an account, permutation symmetry is a manifestation of the
metaphysically peculiar nature of the quanta. However, this account of permutation symmetry
as a property of the state can also be accommodated within the alternative metaphysics of
particles as individuals. In this case, as I have indicated elsewhere, the state space breaks up
into sub-spaces of different symmetry, with transitions between such sub-spaces suitably
prohibited. And permutation symmetry is then a kind of initial condition representing a further
structural characteristic of the state space. Thus we seem to face our metaphysical
underdetermination once again.
Huggett's recent analysis of permutation invariance (1999) can be seen as an attempt to
establish an alternative to both the particles-as-individuals and particles-as-non-individuals
packages, where the former takes permutation invariance to be a kind of mysterious 'brute fact'
of the universe and the latter takes it to be associated with the non-individuality of quanta. The
central motif of Huggett's approach is that permutation i variance should be regarded
straightforwardly as a symmetry on a par with rotational symmetry, for example, and hence it
is symmetry considerations, rather than either 'brute fact' or metaphysics, which explains
quantum statistics. Of course, what is meant by 'a symmetry' needs to be spelled out and
Huggett takes us through three such explications:
First of all, permutations are covariant, in the sense - as Huggett takes it - that the
permutation group has a unitary representation in the state space. However, the explanation of
(non-relativistic) spin requires not just that the rotation group has a unitary representation but
also, of course, that the state vectors lie within multiplets of distinct intrinsic angular momenta,
0, 1/2, 1, and so on (Huggett ibid., p. 337). In other words, the representations must also be
irreducible. This gives a stronger notion of symmetry, which Huggett calls 'elementary state
covariance': a symmetry group is said to be elementary state covariant if and only if the particle
state vectors transform according to the unitary representation of the group (bid., p. 338). The
(philosophical) point then is that we now have an account of the relationship between quantum
statistics and permutations which, Huggett claims, is identical to that which is given for spin
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and rotations in non-relativistic quantum physics: if permutations are included in the full
group of symmetries and it is postulated that this group is elementary state covariant, then only
those many-particle states are allowed which are appropriately symmetrized or para-
symmetric. The advantages of this are three-fold: i) it provides an explanation of the state
space restrictions in terms of symmetry '... without the unnecessary extra logical strength of
further (possibly questionable) assumptions' (ibid., p. 339); ii) it provides an understanding of
symmetrization within the many-particle tensor product formalism without having to invoke
the Fock space that the non-individual quanta interpretation hinges upon; and, crucially, iii) it
provides a unified treatment of quantum statistics and spin in terms of a fundamental
symmetry principle (ibid., pp. 339-340)54.
Now, of course, as Huggett acknowledges, permutation symmetryis very different
from rotational symmetry: a quantum system is not just covariant but invariant, in the sense
that permutations are not just indistinguishable to similarly permuted observers but to all
observers. Nevertheless, he argues, permutation invariance is implied by a further symmetry
principle which space-time symmetries also obey, together with the formal structure of the
permutation group. This further principle is what he calls 'global Hamiltonian symmetry'
which implies that the relevant symmetry operator commutes with the relevant Hamiltonian.
What we take the relevant Hamiltonian to cover is crucial here because, again as Huggett
acknowledges, the principle would appear to be violated in the case where, for example, we
have a noncentral potential term in the Hamiltonian of an atomic system, but, he insists, the
symmetry is restored if we consider the 'full' Hamiltonian of system plus field, which does
commute with the operators of the rotation group. As he points out (ibid., p. 345), if observers
are taken to be systems too, this symmetry principle is equivalent to covariance for space-time
symmetries. 
With regard to the permutation group, of course, permutations of a sub-system are
permutations of the whole system and the above 'global Hamiltonian symmetry' very
straightforwardly implies permutation invariance, without any additional assumptions
concerning the structure of state space (ibid., pp. 344-345). Hence, Huggett concludes,
'... we should view permutations in a similar light to rotations: we should not take [permutation invariance] as
a fundamental symmetry principle in order to explain quantum statistics. Instead we should recognize that it is
a particular consequence of global Hamiltonian symmetry given the group structure of the permu ations.
Further, if we accept the similarity of permutation and rotation symmetry, it becomes natural to see quantum
statistics as a natural result of the role symmetries play in nature, via [elementary state covariance]' (ibid., p.
346).
Thus quantum statistics comes to be explained in terms of a fundamental symmetry
principle. This is an attractive proposal which meshes nicely with the history of this subject.
Nevertheless, one might feel that the proposed explanation contains a crucial lacuna. Consider:
as Huggett acknowledges, permutation symmetry i  different from space-time symmetries and
permutation invariance only follows from his general symmetry principle given the particular
structure of the permutation group. This generates the obvious question: why should the
group structure be this way and not like that of the rotation group? Or, better perhaps, since
the question could be answered by simply insisting 'that's the way the maths is', why should
this particular piece of maths be applicable?55 One obvious answer is to say that it reflects the
nature of the objects themselves, as non-individual quanta. In other words, the explanatory gap
gets filled by metaphysics and we fall back to the particles-as-non-individuals view.
Alternatively, we might insist that it has nothing to do with the objects themselves, which can
still be regarded as individuals but is a reflection of some kind of initial condition for our
universe. Of course, Huggett would be unhappy with either option and might insist that it is
enough to note the general symmetry principle plus the structure of the permutation group -
the explanatory buck stops there. And indeed it has to stop somewhere, so the issue comes
down to that of what counts as an appropriate terminus. At this point we might recall some
                                                
54And as Huggett notes, unification is deemed to be of central importance in certain philosophical
accounts of explanation.
55There is another, related question, which is 'how does this mathematics get applied/' The answer to this
question involves spelling out the sorts of moves - particularly idealisations and approximations - made
by the likes of Wigner, Weyl and von Neumann, for example.
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more history: Newton famously refused to elaborate on the metaphysics of gravity and
insisted that he could explain the phenomena using his law of universal gravitation and that
was enough. Leibniz, caught up in his own baroque form of metaphysics, equally famously
objected that this left gravity as an 'occult' force. We'll leave it to the student of counterfactual
history to wonder whether Leibniz would have been satisfied with Einstein's attempt to bring
gravity back into the light!
What was it that Leibniz found unsatisfactory with Newton's account and does it have
anything to do with the uneasiness that one might feel at Huggett's attempt at an explanatory
terminus? Perhaps it has to do with the feeling that for an explanation to be satisfactory, it has
to incorporate some aspect of how the world is, from a realist perspective, or how the world
could be, from that of today's anti-realist. Let's consider the analogy with spin: here one might
object that the rotation group doesn't actually explain spin in the sense of accounting for its
existence. Spin is a property that is attributed to objects, originally for experimental reasons,
and its nature, possible values etc. came to be described group theoretically in the well known
way: for massive particles the possible representations of the rotation group, as the relevant
little group of the Poincaré group, yield the allowed values of spin, and this is the case in both
relativistic and non-relativistic QM (the latter being the case with which Huggett is concerned),
whereas for massless particles one needs to introduce parity and the explanation of the two
spin states for such particles is relativistic. But the point is that what one is explaining here is
not the existence of spin, as an intrinsic property, but its structure, the values it can take in
particular cases and so on.
In the case of quantum statistics, on the other hand, it is the existence of these statistics
themselves, as expressed via permutation invariance, that we are trying to explain and we might
feel justified to ask, with regard to this explanation, what is it about the world that gives rise to
this phenomenon? If the spin-statistics theorem could be proven, we could follow the
reductionist route and the explanation would terminate in spin, understood as an intrinsic
property of things. (Of course, if the theorem could be proven, one might feel tempted to push
the reduction the other way and have spin emerging as a result of the statistics, understood in
one of the ways to be canvassed below.) Or we could suggest that the statistics is a holistic or
emergent property of particle collectives, as indicated by Hilborn and Yuca above, but then we
have to come up with an appropriate metaphysics of emergence56. Or we could insist that it
has to do with the peculiar metaphysical nature of the particles themselves, as non-individual
objects. Or we could say that the objects are not peculiar at all, metaphysically speaking, and
that permutation invariance is a reflection of certain initial or boundary conditions that pertain
in our universe. All these options provide a metaphysical component and simply saying that
permutation invariance is nothing more than a result of  a general symmetry principle together
with the structure of the permutation group seems metaphysically and hence explanatorily
deficient.
If we're going to take up Huggett's option and shy away from considerations of the
metaphysical nature of the particles as objects, then we're going to need an appropriate
metaphysics of symmetry and it is precisely this that structuralism aims to provide. This
amounts to a broadening of the group-theoretical approach to elementary particles by
incorporating permutation invariance, understood not in terms of an intrinsic property of the
particles  but, just as these properties themselves, as an aspect of the 'world-structure', if you
like. In other words, the world is ultimately and metaphysically structural in nature and
permutation invariance is simply one manifestation of this structure.
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